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1Key Generation from Wireless Channels: A Review
Junqing Zhang, Trung Q. Duong, Senior Member, IEEE, Alan Marshall, Senior Member, IEEE,
and Roger Woods, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Key generation from the randomness of wireless
channels is a promising alternative to public key cryptography
for the establishment of cryptographic keys between any two
users. This paper reviews the current techniques for wireless
key generation. The principles, performance metrics and key
generation procedure are comprehensively surveyed. Methods for
optimizing the performance of key generation are also discussed.
Key generation applications in various environments are then
introduced along with the challenges of applying the approach
in each scenario. The paper concludes with some suggestions for
future studies.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, key generation, wireless
communication
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Wireless Network Security
The inherent broadcast nature of wireless communication
allows transmissions to be received by any user within the
range, resulting in attackers’ ability to initiate various passive
attacks such as eavesdropping, traffic analysis and monitoring,
etc, or to execute active attacks like jamming, spoofing,
modification, replaying and denial-of-service (DoS) attack,
etc. [1].
There has been extensive research interest to protect wire-
less transmission [2]. Traditionally, the data is secured by clas-
sic encryption schemes [3], [4], which work on the assumption
that the algorithm is complex enough so that the time taken
by eavesdroppers to crack the cryptographic system is much
longer than the validity of the information itself, therefore,
the backward secrecy is guaranteed. As shown in Fig. 1,
classic encryption schemes consist of symmetric encryption
schemes and asymmetric encryption schemes, depending on
the keys that the two cryptographic parties use. Symmetric
encryption schemes use the same key and are usually em-
ployed for data protection thanks to their efficiency in data
encryption. Asymmetric encryption schemes, also known as
public key cryptography, use the same public key but different
private keys and are usually applied for key distribution. An
illustration of a classic encryption system is shown in Fig. 2a,
where Alice and Bob represent two legitimate users who want
to share information securely between each other.
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(a) Illustration of a classic encryption system. Information exchange between
public key cryptography modules is omitted for brevity.
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(b) Illustration of a key generation-based hybrid cryptosystem
Fig. 2. Illustration of wireless network security systems
Classic encryption schemes are faced with several vulnera-
bilities. Take public key cryptography as an example. Firstly, it
depends on the computational hardness of some mathematical
problems, e.g., discrete logarithm. This computational security
nature may not hold in future due to the rapid development
of hardware technology. In addition, it requires a key man-
agement infrastructure which should be secured as well. This
2approach is therefore less attractive for many wireless sensor
networks (WSNs) and ad hoc networks applications, because
sensor nodes have limited computational capacity while ad hoc
networks are decentralized.
While classic encryption schemes are applied in the upper
layers of the communication protocols, the physical layer can
also be exploited to enhance wireless security. Physical layer
security (PLS) schemes leverage unpredictable and random
characteristics of wireless channels in order to achieve in-
formation theoretic-security [5]–[10]. As shown in Fig. 1,
PLS schemes are composed of keyless security and secret
key-based secrecy [8]. Pioneered by Wyner’s wiretap chan-
nel model [11], keyless security does not require keys for
encryption but employs code design and channel properties
of legitimate users and eavesdroppers to achieve secrecy
(see [8] and references therein). However, the legitimate users
usually require full/part of instantaneous/statistical channel
state information (CSI) of the eavesdroppers, which is not
always available in practice and results in a very complex
implementation.
Secret key-based secrecy dated back as early as 1919
when the concept of one-time pad, also known as Vernam
cipher [12], was used to encrypt each message bit with a
random secret key bit. Later on, Shannon laid the theoretical
basis for perfect secrecy [13]. The message M is encoded into
codeword C which does not reveal any information about the
message, i.e.,
H(M |C) = H(M), (1)
where H(·) denotes the entropy. This requires the information
of the key sequence should be larger than, or at least equal to,
the information of the message. One possible way to establish
the key is to generate keys from the wireless channels.
However, in practice, it is very challenging, if not impossible,
to efficiently establish random keys between legitimate users
which cannot be reused. Alternatively, a hybrid cryptosystem
can be constructed by combining key generation and symmet-
ric encryption, as illustrated in Fig. 2b. The security level of
the system is enhanced by replacing public key cryptography
with key generation.
B. Key Generation
In this paper, we review secure key generation from the
randomness of wireless channels. Unlike the computationally
secure nature of the public key cryptography, wireless key
generation is information-theoretically secure, because it is
based on the random characteristics of wireless channels [14],
[15]. In addition, this technique is lightweight and does not
require any aid from other users. A comparison of the above
mentioned schemes is given in Table I.
Key generation was theoretically proposed/investigated
in [14] and [15] in 1993. Key generation model is shown
in Fig. 3, where Alice and Bob want to establish a secure
cryptographic key and an eavesdropper Eve located d-cm
away from Alice, listens to all the transmissions. Alice, Bob
and Eve can get correlated observations Xn = (X1, ..., Xn),
Y n = (Y1, ..., Yn) and Zn = (Z1, ..., Zn), respectively. Alice
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Fig. 3. Key generation model
and Bob will exchange a message s over the public channel,
which may be heard by Eve as well. For any  > 0 and
sufficiently large n, if there exists KA = gA(Xn, s) and
KB = gB(Y
n, s) making the key generation system satisfy
Pr(KA 6= KB) < , (2)
1
n
I(KA; s, Zn) < , (3)
1
n
H(KA) > R− , (4)
1
n
log |K| < 1
n
H(KA) + , (5)
then R in (4) is the achievable key rate, where I(·) denotes
mutual information and K is key’s alphabet. (2) means that Al-
ice and Bob can generate the same key with a high probability;
(3) indicates the message exchange via public discussion leaks
no information to Eve, which guarantees the security of the
generated key; (5) ensures the key is uniformly distributed,
which is desirable for the cryptographic applications. The
largest achievable key rate is defined as key capacity and given
as
CK = min[I(X;Y ), I(X;Y |Z)]. (6)
There has been extensive research effort to implement the
above theory in practice and to approach to the theoretical
limits. The first practical key generation protocol was proposed
in 1995 [16] and since then has triggered research interest in
wireless key generation. Chapter 4 in [7] reviewed the wireless
key generation from the information theory perspective. The
authors in [17] surveyed the key generation development
merging channel probing and quantization as one step, which
is shown later as two separate ones. We note that a recent
study in [18] has introduced the challenges and opportunities
of the key generation but it has not considered implementa-
tion details. Although in [19], key generation schemes have
been summarized, e.g., received signal strength (RSS)-based
and channel phase-based schemes, a thorough review of key
generation techniques is still needed as these schemes and
techniques have evolved fast since then. In this paper, we
provide a literature review on techniques of key generation
systems. We also highlight research areas of key generation
3TABLE I
COMPARISON OF SECURITY SCHEMES
Scheme Description Implementation Complexity Pros Cons
Symmetric
encryption
Legitimate users use the
same key to encrypt data. Yes Low Efficiency in data encryption
Computationally secure;
A secure key required prior.
Asymmetric
encryption
Legitimate users use the
same public key but
different private keys to
distribute a session key.
Yes High Key distribution with differentprivate keys
Computationally secure;
Public key infrastructure required;
Not applicable to low
computational capacity devices.
Keyless
security
Legitimate users securely
communicate by
leveraging code design
and channel properties.
Not reported High Information-theoretically secure;Secret transmission without keys.
Eavesdroppers’ CSI usually
required.
Key
generation
Legitimate users generate
key from the randomness
of the common channel.
Yes Low
Information-theoretically secure;
Lightweight;
No aid from other users required.
Limited by the channel
dynamicity.
that need more understanding and provide suggestions for
future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
and III introduce the key generation principles and evaluation
metrics, respectively. Section IV details the channel parameters
that can be used for key generation, including CSI and RSS.
The key generation procedure is explained in Section V and
optimized in Section VI. Applications in various environments
are then reviewed in Section VII. Section VIII concludes the
paper with future research suggestions.
II. KEY GENERATION PRINCIPLES
Key generation is based on three principles, i.e., temporal
variation, channel reciprocity, and spatial decorrelation.
Temporal variation is introduced by the movement of the
transmitter, receiver or any objects in the environment, which
will change the reflection, refraction and scattering of the
channel paths. The randomness caused by such unpredictable
movement can be used as the random source for key genera-
tion [20]–[26]. There is research effort to exploit the random-
ness in frequency domain [27]–[31] and spatial domain [32]–
[36]. However, in a static environment where these features
remain the same, the randomness is rather limited. Temporal
variation is thus still required in order to introduce a sufficient
level of randomness. It can be quantified by the autocorrelation
function (ACF) of the signal, which is given as
RX(t,∆t) =
E{(X(t)− µX)(X(t+ ∆t)− µX)}
σ2X
, (7)
where E{·} denotes the expectation operator, and µX and σX
represents the mean value and standard deviation of random
variable X(t), respectively.
Channel reciprocity implies that the multipath and fading
at both ends of the same link, i.e., same carrier frequency,
are identical which is the basis for Alice and Bob to generate
the same key. The signals have to be measured by hardware
platforms, which usually work in half duplex mode and intro-
duce noise. Therefore, the received signals of the uplink and
downlink path are asymmetric due to the non-simultaneous
measurements and noise effects, which limits key generation
applications within time-division duplexing (TDD) systems
and slow fading channels. These effects can be mitigated using
signal processing algorithms discussed in Section V-A. The
signal similarity can be quantified by the cross-correlation
between the measurements, which is given as
ρXY =
E{XY } − E{X}E{Y }
σXσY
. (8)
Spatial decorrelation indicates that any eavesdropper lo-
cated more than one half-wavelength away from either user
experiences uncorrelated multipath fading, which can also
be described by the cross-correlation between the signals of
legitimate users and eavesdroppers. This property is essential
for the security of key generation systems and has been
claimed in most key generation papers. However, it may
not be satisfied in all the environments. Channel variation is
contributed by large-scale fading (i.e., path loss and shadow-
ing) and small-scale fading [37]. In the Jake’s model with
a uniform scattering Rayleigh environment and without a
line-of-sight (LoS) path, if the number of scatters grows to
infinity, the signal decorrelates over a distance of approx-
imately one half-wavelength [37]. Some experiments have
also shown this property [38]–[41]. However, when large-
scale fading is dominant, special attention is required as the
channel is more correlated [42]. There is research reporting
that signals observed by eavesdroppers are correlated to signals
of legitimate users [43]–[45], which makes key generation sys-
tems vulnerable and requires special consideration to combat
eavesdropping. In general, spatial decorrelation has not been
extensively studied and is worth more research input.
III. PERFORMANCE METRICS
Key generation is designed to establish cryptographic keys
for encryption and/or authentication. These applications have
special requirements on the key’s randomness, refresh rate,
etc. Thus, key generation systems can be correspondingly
evaluated in terms of three important metrics: randomness, key
generation rate (KGR), and key disagreement rate (KDR).
A. Randomness
Randomness is the most important feature of key generation
systems. Cryptographic applications have strict requirements
on the randomness of the key sequence [4]. A statistical
4randomness test suite provided by National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) [46] is widely used to test
the randomness of random number generators (RNGs) and
pseudo random number generators (PRNGs). In essence, a key
generation system is a type of RNG, so NIST statistical test
suite can also be applied.
As randomness is a probabilistic property, statistical analysis
is employed to test a specific null hypothesis (H0), i.e., the
sequence under test is random. A P-value is returned by each
test, which summarizes the strength of the evidence against the
null hypothesis. A significance level α, typically in the range
[0.001, 0.01], is chosen. When P-value ≥ α, the sequence is
accepted as random, otherwise, it is deemed to be non-random.
There are infinite statistical features of a random sequence,
therefore, in practice, it is impossible to test all the features
using a finite set of tests [46]. The NIST test suite has 15
tests to evaluate different randomness features, each for a
specific feature of the randomness, e.g., the proportion of
1s and 0s (frequency test), periodic feature (DFT test), etc.
Some tests require extremely long sequence. For example, the
recommended input length is 106 for the linear complexity,
random excursions and random excursions variant tests and
is judged to be very long in a key generation system. Thus,
most of the key generation research has only adopted a subset
of the randomness tests to assess a subset of the randomness
features [20], [21], [23], [30], [47]–[50].
The readers are referred to [46] for a detailed description of
all the randomness tests and advised to download the source
code of the test suite to evaluate the randomness of their key
generation systems.
B. KGR
KGR describes the amount of secret bits produced in one
second/measurement. It mainly depends on environment con-
ditions, which determines the amount of randomness available
for extraction. A high KGR is essential for the real time
key generation process as the cryptographic schemes require
a certain length of keys. For example, advance encryption
standard (AES) needs a key sequence with a minimum length
of 128 bits.
C. KDR
KDR is the percentage of the different bits between the
keys generated by Alice and Bob, which is defined as
KDR =
∑N
i=1 |KA(i)−KB(i)|
N
, (9)
where N is the length of keys. The KDR should be smaller
than the correction capacity of information reconciliation
techniques, otherwise, key generation fails, which is discussed
in Section V-C.
D. Summary
There are also other assessment metrics such as scalability
and implementation issues [19]. However, randomness, KGR
and KDR are the most important and popular metrics which
describe the success and efficiency of the system, which are
therefore used for evaluation throughout this paper.
IV. CHANNEL PARAMETERS
Channel parameters are the most essential part of key gen-
eration, as it is the random source representing unpredictable
channel characteristics. In this section, CSI and RSS are
reviewed.
A. CSI
CSI is a fine-grained channel parameter which provides
detailed channel information. CSI-based systems are able to
provide a high KGR [51] and have been experimentally proved
to be immune to predictable channel attacks [30]. In this paper,
CSI mainly refers to channel impulse response (CIR) and
channel frequency response (CFR).
1) CIR: A multipath channel can be modelled as several
resolvable path components and its CIR h(τ, t) can be given
as
h(τ, t) =
L(t)∑
l=0
αl(t)e
−jφl(t)δ(τ − τl(t)), (10)
where αl(t), φl(t) and τl(t) are the amplitude attenuation,
phase shift and time delay of the lth tap, respectively, L(t) is
the total path number and δ(·) is the Dirac function.
CIR has been proved to be ideal for key generation [51].
It has both amplitude and phase information. In wideband
systems, the phase shift φl(t) can be estimated and used for
key generation [52]–[55]. It can also be used in narrowband
systems [29], [47], [48], but the phase in this case is decreased
into a single-dimension parameter which loses lots of channel
information. Phases can be accumulated to each other and
this special feature leads to interesting applications such as
group and cooperative key generation [47], [48]. In addition,
phases of all the paths are distributed uniformly on [0, 2pi],
which are not affected by the path power. There is only one
practical phase-based key generation system implemented in
a narrowband system [29] and no practical wideband-based
systems have been reported yet. This is because phase is
vulnerable to noise, carrier frequency offset and asynchronous
clocks/clock drift at the receiver, etc.
Another aspect is amplitude of CIR. In an ultra wideband
(UWB) system, the amplitude can be estimated by sending
a pulse signal [39], [40], [56]–[59]. The UWB-based mea-
surement systems are usually constructed by oscilloscope,
waveform generator, etc. In a narrowband system when the
transmission power is fixed, the amplitude of CIR is equivalent
to the received power [29]. The power of CIR decreases with
delay, e.g., it follows exponential distribution in an indoor
environment, resulting in a high KDR for the paths with small
power as they are vulnerable to the noise. This may be tackled
by using the peak CIR only [20] which sacrifices the KGR,
or using an adaptive quantization algorithm [58].
2) CFR: CFR provides channel effect in frequency domain
and can be given as
H(f, t) =
∫ τmax
0
h(τ, t)e−j2pifτdτ, (11)
where τmax is the maximum channel delay. Channel estima-
tion in orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM)
5systems can get a noisy observation of CFR [60]–[63], which
can be written as
Ĥ(f, t) = H(f, t) + ŵ(f, t), (12)
where ŵ(f, t) is the noise effect in frequency domain.
CFR-based systems have been mostly implemented in IEEE
802.11 OFDM systems [30], [31], [64], [65], as it is convenient
to extract channel estimation. Only the amplitude of the
channel estimation is used in practical implementation [30],
[31], [65] as the phase estimation is usually impacted by
the time and frequency offset. CFR may also be estimated
by comparing the frequency spectra of the transmitted and
received signal [66]. Unlike the CIR, the powers of the
channel responses of all the frequencies are identical in an
uncorrelated scattering environment [51], which is beneficial
for the improvement of KGR [30], [31].
Channel estimation information is not available in most
WiFi network interface cards (NICs) with the current excep-
tion of Intel WiFi Link 5300 wireless NIC [67]. Customized
hardware platforms are also able to provide CSI, such as
universal software radio peripheral (USRP) [68] and wireless
open-access research platform (WARP) [69].
B. RSS
The transmitted signal x(t) experiences the multipath chan-
nel and the received signal can be written as
y(t) =
∫ τmax
0
h(τ, t)x(t− τ)dτ + n(t), (13)
where n(t) is the noise effect. The instantaneous power of the
signal |y(t)|2 is usually not reported by NICs and transceivers.
However, the average power level is usually available and
referred as RSS.
RSS is currently the most popular channel parameter used
in key generation, especially for practical implementation due
to its availability. Most RSS-based key generation systems are
applied either in IEEE 802.11 systems [20]–[22], [50], [70] or
in IEEE 802.15.4 systems [23]–[27], [71].
RSS is a coarse-grained channel information metric and
only one RSS value can be obtained from each packet, which
limits the KGR. In addition, RSS is vulnerable to predictable
channel attacks [21], [29]. What’s more, whilst there are lots
of practical implementations, the theoretical modelling and
analysis of RSS has not been reported yet. Finally, RSS may be
interpreted in different ways, which requires special attention
when the devices are provided by different manufacturers [21],
[70], [72].
C. Summary
CIR h(τ, t) is the intrinsic random source for both CSI-
based and RSS-based key generation systems. The parameters
measured by users may be different but are always a function
of h(τ, t).
The selection of the channel parameters for key generation
will mainly be determined by the wireless techniques adopted.
For example, RSS is available in all wireless systems, includ-
ing systems modulated by direct sequence spread spectrum
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Fig. 4. Key generation procedure
(DSSS) or frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS). The
signal power is quite small in UWB systems but the CIR can
be measured through the pulse transmission. A summary and
comparison of key generation applications in different wireless
networks is given in Table II.
V. KEY GENERATION PROCEDURE
Key generation procedure can be divided into four stages:
channel probing, quantization, information reconciliation, and
privacy amplification, as summarized in Table III and illus-
trated in Fig. 4. One user serves as the initiator, and the other
as the responder. Without loss of generality, Alice is selected
as the initiator. In order to simplify the flow chart, the stage
synchronization between Alice and Bob is not shown.
A. Channel Probing
Channel probing is the key step to harvest the randomness
from channel which requires two users to alternately measure
the common channel through the received signals. As shown
in Fig. 4, at time ti,A, Alice transmits the ith probing signal
to Bob who will measure some channel parameter through the
received signal and store it in Y ′i . At time ti,B , Bob transmits
6TABLE II
KEY GENERATION APPLICATIONS IN WIRELESS NETWORKS
Technique Modulation Parameter Features Testbed Representative Work
IEEE 802.11
n MIMO OFDM RSS, CSI
MIMO OFDM enables CSI
measurements in both
frequency and spatial domains RSS: all NICs;
CSI: Intel 5300 NIC, and customized
hardware platforms, such as
USRP [68] and WARP [69]
RSS-based: [22]
CSI-based [30], [31]
a OFDM RSS, CSI OFDM enables CSI
measurements in frequency
domain
RSS-based: [20],
[21], [50], [70]
CSI-based: [65]
g OFDM, DSSS RSS, CSI
b DSSS RSS RSS available
IEEE 802.15.4 DSSS RSS
Widely used in WSN;
Sensor motes are powered by
battery and with low
computational capacity;
Usually low mobility.
MICAz [73], TelosB [74] [23]–[27], [71]
Bluetooth FHSS RSS FHSS allows sampling RSSin different frequencies. Smartphones [75]
UWB Pulse CIR Low power, large bandwidth(> 500 MHz)
Constructed by oscilloscope,
waveform generator, etc [39], [40], [56]–[59]
LTE MIMO OFDM RSS, CSI
Only applied in slow fading
channel for key generation;
Ability to adjust parameters,
such as power allocation;
No practical implementation
reported yet.
Smartphones [76]
TABLE III
KEY GENERATION PROCEDURE
Stage Purpose Research Problems
Channel probing Channel measurements through thereceived signals.
• Channel parameters: The granularity of the chosen parameter determines
the sampling efficiency.
• Signal pre-processing: Improving signals’ cross-correlation by
interpolation and/or filtering.
• Channel probing rate: Removing redundancy between the measurements.
Quantization Conversion of channel measurementsinto binary values
• Selection of the threshold and quantization level.
• Performance optimization between randomness, KGR and KDR.
Information reconciliation
Reconciliation of the mismatch bits
between Alice and Bob using
protocols or error correction codes
• Optimization between the correction capacity and information leakage.
Privacy amplification Removal of information revealed ininformation reconciliation stage
• Cross design with information reconciliation.
• Determination of the amount of leaked information.
his ith probing signal to Alice who will also measure the
same channel parameter and store it in X ′i . The sampling time
difference ∆ti = |ti,A− ti,B | is deliberately kept smaller than
the channel coherence time so the channel during the two
probes can be regarded as constant. Alice and Bob will repeat
the above process until sufficient results are collected.
Research in channel probing mainly considers channel pa-
rameter, signal pre-processing, and channel probing rate. The
channel parameters valid for key generation have already been
discussed in Section IV. Although the channel features at each
end of the link are reciprocal, the measured received signals
are asymmetric mainly due to non-simultaneous measurements
(i.e., ∆ti 6= 0) and the independent noise residing in the two
separate hardware platforms. Therefore, signal pre-processing
is used to improve the cross-correlation between the received
signals, i.e., Xi = f(X ′i) in Fig. 4. The effects of non-
simultaneous measurements and noise can be mitigated by
interpolation [23], [24] and filtering [25], [30], [49], [77], [78],
respectively.
There may be redundancy within the sampled measurements
Xm and Y m, which are therefore resampled by a probing
rate Tp, chosen to be larger than the coherence time. An
optimal probing rate is determined based on the modelling
of the ACF of the signal [64] when the channel is changing
in the same rate. However, the channel randomness is caused
by unpredictable movement, leading to different change rate
7of the channel condition. A fixed probing rate results in po-
tential problems such as inefficient probing when the channel
changes fast or redundancy between the samples when the
channel changes slowly. Therefore, a proportional-integral-
derivative (PID) controller-based adaptive probing system has
been designed to tune the probing rate according to the channel
conditions [79], which could generate key sequences both se-
curely and effectively in a dynamically changing environment.
Channel phase-based system in [47] does not suffer from the
above problem as it can probe each other continuously. This is
because besides the phase shift incurred by the channel, there
is also a random initial phase introduced at each side, which
is not affected by the channel coherence time.
B. Quantization
Similar to an analog-to-digital converter (ADC), quantiza-
tion in key generation is also a method to map the analog
channel measurements into binary values. The quantization
level QL in key generation has the same meaning as in
ADC, which is the number of key bits quantized from each
measurement. Due to the discrepancy between received signals
of any two users, the quantization level is adjusted according
to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the channel. In multi-bit
quantization, Gray coding may be used in order to reduce the
key disagreement.
The thresholds are the reference levels used to divide
the measurements into different groups. Mean value µ (or
together with standard deviation σ) [20], [21] and cumula-
tive distribution function (CDF) [24] are commonly used to
determine the thresholds. Mean value and standard deviation-
based quantization scheme has simple implementation. The
thresholds are determined as
η+ = µ+ α× σ; (14)
η− = µ− α× σ. (15)
When α 6= 0, the measurements between η+ and η− will be
dropped. The samples above η+/below η− will be converted
to 1/0. The CDF-based quantizer is detailed in Algorithm 1,
which is more flexible as it can be designed as multi-bit
quantizer. In addition, its thresholds can be tuned to guarantee
the same proportion of 0s and 1s, an important feature for the
randomness.
Algorithm 1 CDF-based quantization algorithm
1: F (x) = Pr(Xn < x)
2: ηi = F
−1( i2QL ), i = 1, 2, ..., 2
QL − 1
3: η0 = −∞
4: η2QL =∞
5: Construct Gray code bi and assign them to different
intervals [ηi−1, ηi]
6: K(j,QL) = bi, if ηi−1 ≤ Xj < ηi
In essence, the quantizer design is the adjustment of the
quantization level and threshold in order to approach an
optimal performance of the randomness, KGR and KDR. This
results in different design variations, e.g., adaptively adjusting
the threshold in order to follow the slow variation of the
signal and finally avoiding long 1s or 0s and improving the
randomness feature [21]; multi-bit quantization for a higher
KGR [24]; dropping bits which are not all at the same side
of the threshold for a better agreement [20]. Performance
evaluation and comparison of the quantization schemes can
be found in [41], [80].
C. Information Reconciliation
Although signal pre-processing algorithms can be adopted
to improve the cross-correlation of the channel measurements,
there may still be key disagreement between Alice and Bob
after quantization. The mismatch can be corrected using infor-
mation reconciliation techniques, which can be implemented
with protocols such as Cascade [21], [49], [79], [81] or
error correcting code (ECC) like low-density parity-check
(LDPC) [51], [82], [83], BCH code [84], [85], Reed-Solomon
code [86], Golay code [23], [26], [29], and Turbo code [87],
etc. ECC-based reconciliation schemes are more efficient than
Cascade, but they also leak more information [81] and have
higher complexity [7]. The selection of the ECC depends
on the complexity and correction capacity. For example, the
maximum correction capacity rate of [n, k, t] BCH code is
given as
ζ =
tmax
n
=
2m−2 − 1
2m − 1 , (16)
which approaches 0.25 when m becomes large.
Secure sketch [84] is introduced as an example, which is
also illustrated in Fig. 4. An ECC C is adopted to correct the
disagreement. Alice first randomly selects a codeword c from
C and then calculates s by exclusive OR-ing her key sequence
KA with c, i.e., s = XOR(KA, c), which is then sent to Bob
by the public channel. Bob will calculate c′′ by exclusive OR-
ing his key sequence KB with the correctly received s, i.e.,
c′′ = XOR(KB , s), and decode c′ from c′′. He calculates KB
′
by exclusive OR-ing c′ with s, i.e., KB
′
= XOR(c′, s). When
the Hamming distance between c and c′′ is smaller than the
correction capacity t of the correction code, i.e., dis(c−c′′) <
t, Bob can agree on the same key as Alice, i.e., KB
′
= KA.
The key agreement can be confirmed by implementing
cyclic redundancy check (CRC) or other protocols and tools,
e.g., automated validation of Internet security protocols and
applications (AVISPA) software was used in [57]. There will
be a risk that the KDR exceeds the correcting capacity rate
of the information reconciliation which results in a failure
and restart of the entire key generation process from channel
probing.
D. Privacy Amplification
Some information is transmitted publicly in the information
reconciliation stage, which can be heard by the eavesdropper
as well. This can potentially compromise the security of
the key sequence. Privacy amplification is then employed to
remove the revealed information from the agreed key sequence
at Alice’s and Bob’s side [88]. This can be implemented by
extractor [47], or universal hashing functions, such as leftover
hash lemma [21], [50], cryptographic hash functions (e.g.,
8secure hash algorithm) [86], [87], and Merkle-Damgard hash
function [79].
Privacy amplification and information reconciliation always
appear together, which requires a cross design between these
two stages. However, in practice, it is difficult to quantify the
amount of the leaked information, or to identify where the
leakage occurs in the data.
E. Summary
The key generation implementation is usually low cost, as
it only requires non-complex operations, e.g., sampling and
storing data in the channel probing stage. All these operations
can be implemented using the off-the-shelf hardware, with
only a change to the drivers.
The key generation procedures vary according to the system
implementation. All the key generation systems need channel
sampling and quantization while information reconciliation
and privacy amplification may be not applied due to specific
implementation and environment where the systems achieve
perfect agreement after quantization [20], [25].
VI. PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION
The design criterion of key generation systems is to attain
an optimal performance, which can be achieved by a careful
consideration of the key generation stages.
KGR can be improved by the appropriate selection of
channel parameter, channel probing rate, and quantization
scheme, etc, which are summarized as follows:
• Randomness extraction from the fine-grained CSI [30],
[31], [51], [64].
• More channel information extraction by leveraging mul-
tiple antenna diversity [22], [32];
• Introduction of relay nodes in order to make use of
the channel information between the users and the relay
nodes [48], [89]–[91];
• Employment of random initial phase in order to achieve
multiple probes in one coherence time [47];
• Adaptive channel probing [79];
• Multi-bit quantization [21], [24];
The above methods can also be combined to further improve
the KGR if the system permits. For example, a MIMO OFDM
system can extract keys very efficiently as it is able to measure
the CSI using multiple antennas [30].
The KDR will usually be high if the sampled channel
parameters are quantized directly, especially in low SNR
environments. The KDR can be reduced with the aid of the
signal processing algorithms discussed in Section V-A and
using a more robust quantization algorithm such as level
crossing [20]. A KDR comparison of different quantization
schemes can be found in [41], [80].
The three evaluation metrics, i.e., randomness, KGR, and
KDR, contradict each other. For example, a fast probing rate
will produce a high KGR but may result in temporal redun-
dancy and compromise the randomness. A bigger quantization
level can also produce a higher KGR, however, it may lead to a
larger KDR especially in low SNR environments. Randomness
usually cannot be compromised. Therefore, when designing a
key generation system, a relatively optimal tradeoff should
be achieved between KGR and KDR according to the system
requirements and environments. For example, the KDR in [20]
can be kept as low as 10−8 by adjusting the parameters in their
level crossing algorithm but the KGR will be very small. A
comparison of selected key generation systems in terms of
techniques and performance is given in Table IV.
VII. APPLICATION SCENARIOS
Key generation has already been prototyped in several
different areas. In this section, a review of applications in
different environments is carried out and the challenge of each
environment is discussed.
A. Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs)
WLAN connectivity is now incorporated into most laptops,
tablets and smartphones, making it the most popular wireless
access technology. The main WLAN standards are IEEE
802.11 a/b/g/n operating in 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands. Due
to its wide availability, many practical key generation imple-
mentations in WLAN have been reported. WLAN is primarily
designed for indoor environments, where there is limited
mobility. Therefore, in order to guarantee the randomness of
the key sequence, the probe rate should be relatively large,
as the channel can remain essentially static over long periods,
which results in a low KGR.
RSS is available in all the WLAN standards and can be
obtained in the commercial NICs. The research emphases are
mainly on the improvement of KGR and decrease of KDR. For
example, KGR is increased with the aid of multi-antenna [22]
or adaptive channel probing [79], and KDR can be decreased
by using a level crossing algorithm [20].
CSI-based systems are also feasible as IEEE 802.11 a/g/n
use OFDM modulation and channel estimate can provide
detailed channel information. Practical systems have been
implemented using Intel WiFi Link 5300 wireless NIC and
the KGR is much higher than RSS-based systems [30], [31].
The channel responses of individual OFDM subcarriers have
also been leveraged for key generation [65] and an optimal
probing rate can be tuned based on its theoretic model [64].
B. Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
WSNs are widely used in environment monitoring, health
care, or military [92], where there is a clear need to protect
the data exchanged. The sensor nodes in WSNs are equipped
with 802.15.4 transceivers operating in the 2.4 GHz to 2.8 GHz
industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) band. RSS information
is usually available in these transceivers and can be used
to establish the keys in WSNs. However, the sensor nodes
are static or with little movement, battery powered, and with
low computational capacity, which places special requirements
on the implementation. A key generation architecture for
resource-constrained devices is proposed in [93].
In order to address the issue of the static nature of
channel in WSN, randomness in the frequency domain is
exploited [27]. The key generation system is designed to probe
9TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF KEY GENERATION SYSTEMS
Representative Work Technique Testbed Parameter KGR KDR
Liu et al. [30]
Fine-grained channel information;
Multi-bit quantization (3-bit);
MIMO (2× 2).
Laptop with Intel WiFi
Link 5300 NIC CSI 360 bit/pkt 8%
Zeng et al. [22] Multiple antenna diversity Laptop with Intel WiFiLink 5300 NIC RSS 10 bit/s
1 10%
Wei et al. [79] Adaptive channel probing Laptop with Atheros NIC RSS 100 bit/s N/A
Patwari et al. [24] Multi-bit adaptive quantization TelosB sensor mote RSS 10 ∼ 22 bit/s 0.54% ∼ 2.2%
Mathur et al. [20] Level crossing algorithm2
Customized platform CIR 1.17 bit/s (m = 4) 15.85% ∼ 10−7
(m = 2 ∼ 11,
SNR = 30 dB)Laptop with Atheros NIC RSS 1.3 bit/s (m = 4)
Ali et al. [25]
Channel sampling using regular
data transmission;
Employing Savitzky-Golay filter
to mitigate noise effect.
MICAz sensor mote RSS 0.037 ∼ 0.205 bit/s 0 ∼ 1.6%
1 KGR of a multiple antenna system (3× 3 antenna pairs) is 4.5 higher than the KGR of a single antenna system
2 Level crossing algorithm requires a parameter m, which is the number of the same consecutive bits in an excursion.
on different channels in order to extract the randomness from
the frequency-selective fading. Signals with different carrier
frequencies experience varied fading and thus the RSSs are
different. However, this method requires a frequency-selective
channel and the randomness is rather limited. After the initial
generation from the randomness introduced by frequency
selectivity, the refresh of the key becomes impossible if there
is no further randomness caused by the movement or other
changes to the wireless channel.
Body area network is a special application of WSN with
sensors mounted on the body [94]. An RSS-based key gen-
eration system is implemented in body area networks [25].
In order to save energy, channel is sampled in the course of
a routine transmission rather than dedicated communications.
A Savitzky-Golay low pass filter is employed to mitigate
the noise component so the system can achieve a high key
agreement rate around 98%, or even 100% with a specific
setting. Thus there is no information reconciliation and specific
communication in their system. This is at the cost of very low
KGR. It takes 15 to 35 minutes to generate a 128-bit key.
C. Vehicular Communication
As discussed in Section V-A, when |ti,A − ti,B | is much
smaller than the coherence time, Alice and Bob can get
correlated measurements in a slow fading channel. However, in
vehicular communication, this is not the case because vehicles
can move fast and the coherence time can be as short as a
few hundred µs. In a 20 MHz channel spacing IEEE 802.11
OFDM system, a packet with a maximum rate and minimum
length results in an over-the-air time of 34 µs, which cannot
be considered negligible compared to the coherence time.
There has been research effort applying key generation in
vehicular communication [49], [95], [96]. An RSS-based key
generation system has been implemented using off-the-shelf
IEEE 802.11 radios [49]. RSS measurements are found to be
swamped in the high noise level. A weighted sliding window
smoothing algorithm is adopted, where Alice and Bob work
cooperatively to maximize the correlation coefficient of the
quantized bit sequences. Level crossing is used in their system
but is improved by dynamic parameter adjusting in order to
adapt to the dramatic channel changes. They achieve a secure
system with a bit rate around 5 b/s.
A novel distance reciprocity-based key generation is de-
signed in [96]. While the distance may be measured using
infrared and ultrasound localization systems, a wireless radios
system equipped with TelosB motes is used as an example.
The distance is measured through the long time-averaged RSS
values therefore the fluctuations due to fading and shadowing
are eliminated. As the distance does not change much in a
short time interval, the legitimate users can agree on the same
keys.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
Key generation from the randomness of wireless commu-
nication channels is a promising technique to share crypto-
graphic keys securely between legitimate users. It is relatively
easy to implement using off-the-shelf wireless NICs and can
achieve information-theoretic security. This paper focused on
the techniques of key generation systems, specifically, we
reviewed the key generation principles, metrics and procedure.
We also discussed methods to optimize the key generation
performance. Different application scenarios were surveyed in
order to clarify the features and challenges of each environ-
ment.
There are still open questions to be resolved in order to
make key generation more robust [18], [42]. Some future
research scopes are summarized below.
• Key generation in static environments. Although re-
searchers have tried to introduce randomness into static
channels by employing random beamforming [97], virtual
channels [98] and jamming [85], [99], these methods are
not generic as they either require multi-antenna [97], [98],
aid from other nodes [85] or OFDM modulation [99]. The
ability to operate in a static environment will be essential
for the application of key generation systems.
• Group key generation. There are already some group
key generation protocols [23], [26], [47], [100]–[102],
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but most key generation systems can still only extract
keys in pairs. Group key generation has a wide range
of applications. For example, in ad hoc networks, all the
users will have to exchange secured information and the
network is quite dynamic as there may be many users
frequently joining and leaving.
• Attacks against key generation systems. This research
topic currently receives limited research input. Key gen-
eration is vulnerable both to passive eavesdropping [44],
[103] and active attacks [104], [105], or combined [106].
Research into how we can subvert or defend against such
attacks is essential if we are to construct robust and secure
key generation systems.
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